We demonstrate the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in …rst-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, interdependent values and a¢liated one-dimensional signals. Our proof sidesteps the precisely two ways that single-crossing can fail, which we identify here. We also provide a private value example suggesting that the assumption of one-dimensional signals is essential.
Introduction
There is by now a large literature on …rst-price auctions. While initial e¤orts centered around the symmetric bidder case (e.g., Milgrom and Weber (1982) ), attention has begun to shift toward the even more challenging-and in practice often very relevant-case of asymmetric bidders. A key di¤erence between the two cases is that only the symmetric bidder setting admits closed-form expressions for equilibrium bid functions. Because of this, analysis of equilibrium bidding behavior in asymmetric …rst-price auctions requires an implicit characterization of equilibrium through …rst-order necessary conditions for optimal bidding.
1 But if an equilibrium fails to exist, such an analysis is vacuous.
Our objective here is to provide conditions ensuring the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in nondecreasing bid functions for asymmetric …rst-price auctions with a¢liated private information and interdependent values. As a byproduct, we therefore provide a foundation for the …rst-order approach to analyzing equilibrium bidding behavior in such auctions.
Recent work on the question of equilibrium existence in …rst-price auctions can be found in Athey (2001) , Bresky (1999) , Lebrun (1996 Lebrun ( , 1999 , Lizzeri and Persico (2000) , Jackson and Swinkels (2001) , Maskin and Riley (2000) , and Reny (1999) . 2 But there appears to be a common di¢culty. The above papers restrict attention either to two bidders, symmetric bidders, independent signals, private values, or common values. That is, the most general case involving three or more asymmetric bidders with a¢liated signals and interdependent values is not covered. The reason for this is that standard proof techniques rely on the following single-crossing condition (SCC) exploited with great ingenuity in Athey (2001) :
If the others employ nondecreasing bid functions and one's payo¤ from a high bid is no smaller than that from a lower bid, then the high bid remains as good as the lower one when one's signal rises. However, even when bidders' signals are a¢liated, SCC can fail (see Section 3) unless there is but a single other bidder (as in the two-bidder case), or all signals 1 See, for example, Bajari (1997) . 2 For conditions ensuring uniqueness in two-bidder settings, see Lizzeri and Persico (2000) , Maskin and Riley (1996) and Rodriguez (2000) . Under more restrictive conditions, Maskin and Riley (1996) obtain some uniqueness results for more than two bidders. See also Bajari (1997) and Lebrun (1999) .
3 This is only "half" of the condition. The other half is obtained by reversing the roles of "high(er)" and "low(er)," and replacing "rises" with "falls." See Section 2 for a formal de…nition.
are symmetric and bidders employ the same bidding function (as in the symmetric case), or signals are independent, or values are either purely private or purely common. It is for this reason that a general result is not yet at hand.
Our main insight is that there are only two ways that SCC can fail for a bidder. The …rst is when both of the bids the bidder employs are individually irrational, yielding a negative expected payo¤. The second is when one of the bidder's bids ties one of the opponents' bids with positive probability. That is, we show that subject to no ties and individual rationality, SCC holds. More precisely, we establish the following individually rational tieless single-crossing condition (IRT-SCC) for …rst-price auctions:
If the others employ nondecreasing bid functions and one's payo¤ from a high bid is non-negative and no smaller than that from a lower bid, then the high bid remains as good as the lower one when one's signal rises so long as neither bid ties a positive bid of any opponent with positive probability. 4 Now, standard proofs that monotone pure equilibria exist in …rst-price auctions begin by restricting bidders to …nite grids of bids. This renders their otherwise discontinuous payo¤s, continuous, and so their best reply correspondences are rendered nonempty-valued and upper hemicontinuous. These proofs then establish single-crossing, which, as Athey (2001) demonstrates, su¢ces for the existence of a pure monotone equilibrium in the …nite bid setting. One then takes the limit of such equilibria as the …nite grid of bids becomes dense in R + to obtain a pure monotone equilibrium of the auction with unrestricted bids.
We too shall follow this standard line of proof, but we must tread somewhat more carefully to avoid the two failures of SCC. We begin by restricting bidders to …nite grids of bids with the property that the zero bid is the only bid common to distinct bidders. Consequently, in our restricted auction game, by construction, no ties can occur at positive bids. This avoids one of the ways that SCC can fail.
The remaining failure of SCC, occurring when bidders employ individually irrational bids, does not in fact pose any di¢culty. This is because standard proof techniques employ SCC only to show that, when the others use nondecreasing bidding functions, a bidder's best reply correspondence, as a function of his signal, is (in an appropriate sense) nondecreasing. But because best replies are a fortiori individually rational, SCC need then only hold when a bidder employs individually rational bids. Hence, the more permissive condition IRT-SCC su¢ces to establish the required monotonicity of best reply correspondences, given our choice of the …nite bid sets. Thus, the novel part of our proof centers around the demonstration that IRT-SCC holds in quite general …rst-price auction environments. With this result in hand, the existence of a pure monotone equilibrium in our auction with carefully chosen …nite bid sets follows from arguments due to Athey (2001) .
The …nal step in our proof is again standard. We consider a sequence of monotone pure equilibria of the restricted auction games as the …nite grids of bids become dense in R + and show that any limit point of this sequence is a pure monotone equilibrium of the …rst-price auction with unrestricted bids.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the class of …rst-price auctions covered here, provides the assumptions we maintain throughout, and contains our main result. This section also provides a discussion of Athey's (2001) single crossing condition (SCC) and introduces our individually rational tieless single crossing condition (IRT-SCC). Section 3 provides examples of the two ways Athey's (2001) single crossing condition can fail. Section 4 provides a sketch of the proof of IRT-SCC. Section 5 provides a private value example suggesting that one-dimensionality of the bidders' signals is essential for the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria in the class of …rst-price auctions studied here. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
The Model and Main Result
Consider the following …rst-price auction game. There is a single object for sale and N¸2 bidders. Each bidder i receives a private signal s i 2 [0; 1]: The joint density of the bidders' signals is f : [0; 1] N ! R + . After receiving their signals, each bidder i submits a nonnegative sealed bid. The highest bid greater or equal to the public reserve price r¸0 wins the object, with ties broken randomly and uniformly.
If the vector of signals is s = (s 1 ; :::; s N ) and bidder i wins the object with a bid of b i ; then bidder i's payo¤ is given by u i (b i ; s): All other bidders receive a payo¤ of zero. This speci…cation allows for a variety of attitudes toward risk, as well as a variety of payment rules.
We shall maintain the following assumptions. For all bidders i = 1; :::; N : (ii) There existsb¸0 such that u i (b i ; s) < 0 for all b i >b and all
is nondecreasing in s ¡i and strictly increasing in s i : 
where _ andd enote componentwise maximum and minimum, respectively.
Remark 1. It is not necessary that u i (b i ; s) decrease in b i ; only that it is eventually negative for large enough b i : Thus, while we require the winner to be the highest bidder, we do not require the winner to pay his bid, nor even an amount that is an increasing function of his bid. 5 It is important, however, that the winner's payment depend only upon his own bid. Remark 2. Note that A.1(v) is satis…ed automatically when bidder i is risk neutral and the winner must pay his bid because in this case u i (b i ; s) = w i (s) ¡ b i and so the di¤erence expressed in A.1(v) is constant in s: More generally, if .1(v) holds when w i (s) is nondecreasing in s and U 00 i · 0 (i.e. bidder i is risk averse).
Remark 3. Assumption A.2 (i) rules out moving supports, and A.2(ii) requires the bidders' signals to be a¢liated (see MW). 
Note that this speci…cation implies that a lone bid equal to the reserve price is a winning bid. Throughout, upper case letters will denote random variables and lower case letters will denote their realizations. A pure strategy for bidder i is a measurable (bid) function b i : [0; 1] ! R + : Given a vector of pure strategies b = (b 1 ; :::; b N ); let V i (b) denote bidder i's (ex-ante) expected payo¤ in the auction. That is,
where b(S) denotes the random vector (b 1 (S 1 ); :::; b N (S N )) and the expectation is taken with respect to f: It will also be convenient to de…ne bidder i's interim payo¤. Accordingly, let V i (b i ; b ¡i j s i ) denote bidder i's expected payo¤ conditional on his signal s i and given that he bids b i and the others employ the strategies b ¡i : That is,
A pure strategy equilibrium is an N -tuple of pure strategies
for all pure strategies b 0 i : Our interest lies in establishing, for any …rst-price auction game, the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in which each bidder's bid function is nondecreasing in his signal. We shall refer to this as a monotone pure strategy equilibrium. This brings us to our main result. Theorem 2.1. All …rst-price auction games satisfying assumptions A.1 and A.2 possess a monotone pure strategy equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is in the appendix and consists of two main steps. The …rst step establishes that a monotone equilibrium exists when bidders are restricted to …nite sets of bids with no positive bids in common, while the second step shows that the limit of such equilibria, as the sets of permissible bids become dense in R + ; is an equilibrium when, for all bidders, any nonnegative bid is feasible.
The novelty of our approach lies in the …rst step, where standard techniques have up to now failed. For example, it would be straightforward to establish the existence of a monotone equilibrium with …nite bid sets if one could establish the single-crossing condition employed in Athey (2001) . One could then simply appeal directly to Athey's Theorem 1. 6 All statements involving conditional probabilities are made with respect to the following version of the conditional density:
In the context of our …rst-price auction, Athey's (2001) single-crossing condition is as follows. For any bidder i; any bids b i and b 0 i ; and any nondecreasing bid functions b j for all bidders j 6 = i; the following must hold: Unfortunately, Athey's (2001) result cannot be applied because, for arbitrary …nite or in…nite bid sets, SCC can fail in two ways (see Section 3). First, SCC can fail when there are ties at positive bids and this is why we must approximate the bidders' common continuum bid set R + with …nite bid sets whose only common bid is zero.
Second, SCC can fail if a bidder employs an individually irrational bid. But this failure of SCC does not pose a problem because Athey's (2001) techniques nonetheless apply. To see this, recall that Athey employs SCC only to establish that when the others use monotone strategies, a bidder's best reply correspondence, as a function of his signal, is increasing in the strong set order.
7;8 However, being a property of best replies, the required monotonicity can in fact be established precisely as in Athey (2001) so long as SCC holds for bids that are best replies. That is, the failure of SCC for individually irrational bids is immaterial for establishing strong set order monotonicity of the best reply correspondence.
Consequently, the existence of a monotone pure strategy equilibrium can be established in a …rst-price auction with our particular …nite bid set approximation if SCC can be established whenever ties at positive bids are absent and bids are best replies.
We in fact establish a stronger form of single-crossing, which, a fortiori, suf…ces for our purposes. The following individually rational tieless single-crossing condition (IRT-SCC) requires that, in addition to the absence of ties, one of the two relevant bids be individually rational (neither bid is required to be a best reply). 
IRT-SCC. Suppose
The main contribution leading to the proof of Theorem 2.1 is the following proposition. Its proof can be found in the appendix. Remark 4. It can in fact be shown that, given individual rationality, the singlecrossing inequality, IRT-SCC, holds even if ties occur at the higher of the two bids b 0 i and b i : It is only ties at the lower of the two bids that cause single-crossing to fail. But we shall not pursue this further here.
We next illustrate the two ways that SCC can fail.
The Two Failures of Single-Crossing
In each of the two examples below, there are three bidders and the joint distribution of their signals is as follows. The examples will be constructed so that SCC fails for bidder 1. Consequently, bidders 2 and 3 can, for example, be given private values. In each example, Bidder 1's utility will take the quasilinear form u 1 (b; s) = w 1 (s) ¡ b; where, for
; 1]
Figure 3.1 illustrates both the distribution of the others' signals conditional on 1's signal, and bidder 1's value for the good, w 1 (s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ); as a function the other bidders' signals. 9 In each panel, the numbers in square brackets are the probabilities of each of the four regions conditional on 1's signal. In panel (a) 1's signal is low (i.e., 1/2 or less), while in panel (b) it is high (i.e., above 1/2). In both panels, the joint density of s 2 and s 3 is uniform within each region.
The two failures of SCC result from two distinct speci…cations of the values v 0 ; v 1 ; v 2 ; and v 3 :
The First Failure: Individually Irrational Bids
Consider the following values.
Suppose also that bidders 2 and 3 each employ a strictly increasing bidding function that speci…es a bid of 5 at the signal 1/2 and a bid of 6 at the signal 1. Now consider two signals, s 1 and ¹ s 1 ; for bidder 1 such that s 1 < 1=2 < ¹ s 1 : Given the bid functions of bidders 2 and 3, bidder 1 is indi¤erent between bidding 5 and 6 when his signal is s 1 ; but that bidding 5 is strictly better than bidding 6 when 1's signal increases to ¹ s 1 (see below). This of course violates SCC. Furthermore, both bids, 5 and 6; are individually irrational for bidder 1 whether his signal is high or low. As we have already indicated, and as our proof establishes, without ties in bids this is the only way that single-crossing can fail. The requisite calculations follow.
The Second Failure: Ties at Positive Bids
Consider now the following values.
Suppose this time that bidders 2 and 3 bid zero when their signal is 1=2 or lower and bid 120 when their signal is above 1=2: Consequently, bidders 2 and 3 bid zero and 120 with positive probability each.
Consider again two signals, s 1 and ¹ s 1 ; for bidder 1 such that s 1 < 1=2 < ¹ s 1 : Direct calculations now establish that, given the bidding functions of bidders 2 and 3, bidder 1's unique best reply among the bids f0; 120; 167g is 167 when his signal is s 1 ; but his unique best reply when his signal increases to ¹ s 1 is 120: Thus SCC is again violated. However, this time the chosen bids, 120 and 167; are individually rational. The relevant calculations are as follows.
( 1 2 )(336 ¡ 120)
)(336 ¡ 120) = 0
)(336 ¡ 120)
)(336 ¡ 120) = 2
IRT-SCC: A Sketch of the Proof
We now provide a sketch of the proof of IRT-SCC. To keep things simple, we shall consider the case of three bidders, 1, 2, and 3, and establish only part of IRT-SCC for bidder 1. Assumptions A.1 and A.2 are, of course, in force. Consider two bids, ¹ b 1 > b 1 > 0 for bidder 1, and suppose that bidders j = 2; 3 each employ a strictly increasing bidding function,
10 Because the joint density over signals is everywhere strictly positive, both bids of bidder 1 win with strictly positive probability regardless of his signal. Note also that ties occur with probability zero. Throughout this section, the strategies of bidders 2 and 3 will remain …xed, and all statements about 1's payo¤ are against these …xed strategies.
Consider two signals for bidder 1, one high, ¹ s 1 ; and one low, s 1 : We shall content ourselves with showing that if ¹ b 1 is individually rational and at least as good as b 1 for bidder 1 when his signal is low, then ¹ b 1 remains at least as good as b 1 for bidder 1 when his signal is high. Now, b 1 is either individually rational or individually irrational for bidder 1 at ¹ s 1 : Consider …rst the case in which it is individually irrational. Hence, by de…nition, 1's payo¤ from bidding b 1 at ¹ s 1 is negative. Now, because we are assuming that ¹ b 1 is individually rational at s 1 ; 1's payo¤ from bidding ¹ b 1 is nonnegative at s 1 : Therefore, because u 1 ( ¹ b 1 ; s) is nondecreasing in s; and because the signals are a¢liated, ¹ b 1 is also individually rational at ¹ s 1 : 11 Consequently, bidding ¹ b 1 is at least as good as bidding b 1 when 1's signal is high, which is our desired conclusion. So, in the remainder of this proof-sketch we may assume that we are in the other case, namely, that in which b 1 is individually rational for bidder 1 at ¹ s 1 : Consult Figure 4 .1. The …gure identi…es four regions of the joint signal space of bidders 2 and 3. In region A 0 ; both bids, ¹ b 1 and b 1 ; are winning for bidder 1, while in regions A 1 ; A 2 ; and A 3 ; only the higher bid, ¹ b 1 ; is winning for bidder 1. Consequently, as shown in the …gure, the ex-post di¤erence in 1's payo¤ from ¹ b 1 versus b 1 ; which we shall denote by ¢(s); is u 1 ( ¹ b 1 ; s) ¡ u 1 (b 1 ; s) in region A 0 ; while it is simply u 1 ( ¹ b 1 ; s) in the other three regions.
Let
denote the union of the four regions, i.e., the event that ¹ b 1 is a winning bid. When (s 2 ; s 3 ) is outside A; both bids lose and so ¢(s) is zero. Consequently, given his signal s 1 ; the di¤erence in 1's payo¤ from bidding
Now, because ¹ b 1 wins with positive probability regardless of 1's signal, Pr(Ajs 1 ) > 0: Hence, if we could show that E(¢(S)jA; s 1 ) were nondecreasing in s 1 we would be done. The following question thus arises. When are conditional expectations of functions of a¢liated random variables monotone in their conditioning variables? An important and well-known theorem due to Milgrom and Weber (1982) states that if X 1 ; :::; X n are a¢liated and Á(x 1 ; :::; x n ) is a nondecreasing realvalued function, then the expectation of Á; conditional on any number of events of the form X k 2 [a k ; b k ]; is nondecreasing in all the a k and b k ; and where a k = b k is permitted.
So, for example, if the ex-post di¤erence, ¢(s); in 1's payo¤ from bidding ¹ b 1 versus b 1 were nondecreasing in s = (s 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ) across the four regions of the …gure we'd be done. Now, by assumption, within each of the four regions, ¢(s) is, for …xed s 1 ; nondecreasing in s 2 and s 3 ; and for any …xed s 2 and s 3 it is nondecreasing in s 1 : Unfortunately, ¢(s) need not be nondecreasing across all four regions because it can quite easily happen that a negative value of u 1 (b 1 ; s) near the upper border of region A 0 renders u 1 ( ¹ b 1 ; s) ¡ u 1 (b 1 ; s) strictly greater than u 1 ( ¹ b 1 ; s) just across that border into region A 1 ; say, so that ¢(s) falls as (s 2 ; s 3 ) increases from region A 0 into region A 1 : This is the essential di¢culty that must be overcome.
The idea is to instead consider the average values of ¢(s) in each of the four regions, rather than ¢(s) itself. We will see that these average values are nondecreasing and this will allow us to apply Milgrom and Weber's monotonicity result to the desired e¤ect.
First, let us write E(¢(S)jA; s 1 ) as the sum of the conditional expectations over the four regions, i.e., E(¢(S)jA; ; s 1 ) = Pr(A 0 jA; s 1 )E(¢(S)jA 0 ; s 1 ) + Pr(A 1 jA; s 1 )E(¢(S)jA 1 ; s 1 ) + Pr(A 2 jA; s 1 )E(¢(S)jA 2 ; s 1 ) + Pr(A 3 jA; s 1 )E(¢(S)jA 3 ; s 1 ):
As already remarked, ¢(s) is nondecreasing in s 2 [0; 1] £ A k for each k = 0; 1; 2; 3: Consequently, Milgrom and Weber's monotonicity result implies E(¢(S)jA k ; s 1 ) · E(¢(S)jA k ; ¹ s 1 ) for each k: Hence, we may write Consider now the following step function over the four regions of the …gure:
Then we may rewrite once more the above inequality as
Suppose, for the moment, that the step-function h is nondecreasing over all four regions. Then, by Milgrom and Weber's monotonicity result, we'd have
where the last equality follows from the de…nitions of h and the ® k ; and we'd have proven the desired monotonicity of E(¢(S)jA; s 1 ) in s 1 : Hence, it su¢ces to show that h is nondecreasing, or, equivalently, that ® 0 · ® k · ® 3 for k = 1; 2:
Now, for k = 1; 2,
where the inequality follows from Milgrom and Weber's monotonicity result. It therefore remains only to show that ® 0 · ® k for k = 1; 2:
It is here where the individual rationality of the bid b 1 at ¹ s 1 is needed. Note that a bid of b 1 wins precisely when the others' signals are in region A 0 ; and this occurs with positive probability. Hence, b 1 is individually rational at ¹ s 1 if and only if E(u 1 (b 1 ; S)jA 0 ; ¹ s 1 )¸0:
We then have that for k = 1; 2:
where the …rst inequality follows from Milgrom and Weber's monotonicity result and the second follows from the individual rationality of the bid b 1 at ¹ s 1 :
Multi-Dimensional Signals: A Private Value Counterexample
We now provide a private value example suggesting that Theorem 2.1 fails if the bidders' signals are not one-dimensional. The example possesses a unique equilibrium, which is pure and non-monotone. The example is only suggestive because, while it satis…es the multi-dimensional signal analogue of assumption A.1, it involves several extreme distributional speci…cations. For example, some signals are discrete random variables rather than continuous ones, and some signals are perfectly correlated with others. Consequently, the joint signal distribution has no density function and so, formally, A.2 fails. However, the signals in our example are a¢liated, and we conjecture that no smoothed nearby example satisfying A.1 and A.2 will possess a monotone pure strategy equilibrium either.
12 But this remains an open question. There are three bidders, 1,2,3. Bidder 1 receives the two-dimensional signal S 1 = (X; Y ); while bidders 2 and 3 each receive the same two-dimensional signal Proposition 5.1. The above …rst-price auction example possesses a unique equilibrium (up to ex ante probability zero events) which is pure and non-monotone. Indeed, the equilibrium is: For y = 0; 1 and a.e. z; b 1 (0; y) = 0; b 1 (1; 0) = 3; b 1 (1; 1) = 1; b j (y; z) = v(y; z) j = 2; 3:
The proof of the proposition is in the appendix, but the argument is straightforward. Because bidders 2 and 3 have identical values, and because their signals are also identical, their identical values are common knowledge between them. Consequently, a standard Bertrand competition argument establishes that bidders 2 and 3 must each bid their value in equilibrium. Hence, bidders 2 and 3 employ monotone pure strategies. It remains only to …nd bidder 1's best reply. When 1's signal S 1 = (x; y) = (0; y); bidder 1's unique best reply is to bid zero because his value is v 1 = 6x = 0: The interesting case is when x = 1:
When S 1 = (x; y) = (1; 0); bidder 1's value is v 1 = 6 and he knows that Y = 0: Consequently, he knows that the common bid of bidders 2 and 3 is v(0; Z) = Z; which is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] [ [2; 3] ; and a straightforward calculation establishes that 1's unique best reply is to bid 3.
However, when S 1 = (x; y) = (1; 1); bidder 1's value is again v 1 = 6; but he now knows that Y = 1: Consequently, he knows that bidders 2 and 3 each bid v(1; Z) = 7 if Z 2 [2; 3] while they each bid v(1; Z) = Z if Z 2 [0; 1]: Clearly, it would be suboptimal for bidder 1 to bid 7 or more since his value is only 6. Consequently, bidder 1 will bid less than 7 and so can condition on the event that 2 and 3 bid less than 7 as well. But, conditional on bidding less than 7; bidders 2 and 3 submit a common bid that is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]: Another straightforward calculation establishes that bidder 1's unique best reply now is to bid 1.
Hence, bidder 1's unique equilibrium bidding function is non-monotone, falling from a bid of 3 to a bid of 1 when his signal increases from (1; 0) to (1; 1):
One reason for the failure of monotonicity here is the failure of a¢liation to be inherited by monotone functions of multi-dimensional a¢liated random variables. 
Moreover, by A.1 (iv) and Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Weber (1982) (henceforth MW Thm. 5), E(u i ( ¹ b i ; S)jA; s i ) is nondecreasing in s i , and so
; then (A.1) holds simply because the second di¤erence is positive, being the di¤erence between a nonnegative and a negative number. Hence, it su¢ces to establish (A.1) and (A.2)
We shall in fact show more than this, namely, that if
To see this, de…ne for j 6 = i;
Partition A into subevents as follows. For each x 2 f0; 1g N¡1 let
A(x) = fs : Â j (s j ) = x j ; 8j 6 = ig be the event that bidders j 6 = i such that x j = 0 submit bids in [0; b i ]; while bidders j 6 = i such that
13 Consequently, fA(x)g x2f0;1g N¡1 is a partition of A:
14
Note that for any x 2 f0; 1g N¡1 ; our assumption that f > 0 implies that if Pr(A(x)jA; s i ) is zero for some s i ; then it is zero for all s i :
The event A(0) is that in which all bidders j 6 = i bid weakly below b i : Now, if Pr(A(0)jA; s i ) is zero for some s i ; it is zero for all s i ; so that bidder i's bid of b i wins with probability zero regardless of his signal. In this case, (A. (0); s i ) = 1: That is, conditional on the others bidding b i = 0 and conditional on s i , bidder i ties with every other bidder with probability one with a bid of zero. In this case, i's expected payo¤ would be
13 The components of the N ¡1 dimensional vector x are numbered in ascending order excluding i: For example, if i = 2 and N = 4; then x = (x 1 ; x 3 ; x 4 ): This is equivalent to writing x ¡i when x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; x 4 ); but is notationally less burdensome in what follows.
14 The reader might wonder why we do not employ a more succinct notation for the subevents. For example, for J µ N nfig; letting A(J) = fs :
Jg produces the same partition of events as J varies over all subsets of Nnfig: But the reader will see shortly that we will make use of the ordering of the vectors x in f0; 1g N¡1 and the notation A(x) will then prove especially useful. Hence, we may write the left-hand side of (A.4) as
If some probability in the sum above is zero, de…ne the associated conditional expectation to be any …nite number. Because we have assumed that both u i ( ¹ b i ; s) ¡ u i (b i ; s) and u i ( ¹ b i ; s) are nondecreasing in s; their convex combination, u i ( ¹ b i ; s) ¡¸u i (b i ; s); is also nondecreasing in s: Consequently, because the S k are a¢liated, we have (by MW Thm.5)
De…ne h : f0; 1g N¡1 ! R + as follows: For x = 0 de…ne
Next, for all nonzero x de…ne
where the maximum is always well de…ned because Pr(A(0)js i ) > 0: Hence, by MW Thm.5, Pr(A(x)jA;
So, we may rewrite the inequality expressed in (A.5) as
We shall argue that the sum on the right-hand side of (A.8) is nondecreasing in i's signal. To see this, note …rst that given (A.6), h(x) is nondecreasing on f0; 1g N¡1 nf0g: So, h will be nondecreasing on all of f0; 1g N¡1 if h(x)¸h(0) for all nonzero x: But this follows from the fact that for any 0 · y · x such that Pr(A(y)jA; s i ) > 0 (and hence Pr(A(y)jA; ¹ s i ) > 0);
where the …rst inequality follows from MW Thm.5, and the last inequality follows from (A.3). Thus, we have established that h is nondecreasing.
For each vector of signals s; de…ne
So de…ned, Á(s) is nondecreasing in s on A: Consequently, by MW Thm. 5, E(Á(S)jA; S i = s i ) is nondecreasing in s i . Observing that
establishes that the sum on the right-hand side of (A.8) is nondecreasing in i's signal. Consequently, from (A.8) we have
where the …nal equality follows from (A.7) and because Pr(A(x)jA; ¹ s i ) = 0 whenever Pr(A(x)jA; s i ) = 0: Thus, we have established that (A.3) implies (A.4).
Proof of Theorem 2.1. PART 1. In this …rst part of the proof we shall focus attention on a slightly modi…ed …rst-price auction game. There are two modi…cations. First, we restrict the bidders to …nite sets of nonnegative bids. Each …nite set contains the zero bid, but no two sets have any positive bids in common. This means that ties can only occur at bids of zero. Second, we restrict the bidders' strategies so that each bidder must bid zero when his signal is in [0; "); where " 2 (0; 1) is …xed. Because the joint density of signals is strictly positive on [0; 1] N ; every bid b¸r wins with strictly positive probability regardless of one's signal. Consequently, such bids must earn non-negative expected utility in equilibrium. We wish to show the following.
Under the two modi…cations above, a monotone pure strategy equilibrium exists.
To establish this, it would su¢ce to verify the single-crossing condition (SCC) employed in Athey (2001) . We could then appeal to Athey's Theorem 1. However, as we have seen, SCC does not hold in our setting. Fortunately, Athey's existence proof goes through without any changes if the following, more permissive, bestreply single-crossing condition holds in our modi…ed auction.
BR-SCC. If b 0
i is a best reply for s i against b ¡i ; and b i is any other feasible bid, then the inequality
Hence, if we can show that BR-SCC holds in our modi…ed auction, then it possesses a monotone pure strategy equilibrium. 15 We now show that this is indeed the case.
So, suppose that in our modi…ed auction b 0 i is a best reply for s i against the others' monotone strategy b ¡i ; and b i is any other feasible bid for i. If s i 2 [0; "); then b 0 i = b i = 0 and we are done. Hence, we may suppose that s i¸" : Now, because the zero bid is available for i and b 0 i is a best reply for s i ; we must have This establishes BR-SCC for our modi…ed auction and so we conclude that it possesses a monotone pure strategy equilibrium.
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PART 2. In this second part of the proof, we consider a sequence of monotone equilibria of the modi…ed auctions from Part 1. For n = 1; 2; :::; let G n denote the modi…ed auction in which " = 1=n and bidder i's …nite set of bids is denoted by B We shall argue thatb is a monotone equilibrium of the …rst-price auction game.
To do so, we …rst establish that, givenb; the probability that any two distinct bidders each submit the highest bid weakly above r is zero. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that the probability that the bid ¹ b¸r is the highest bid and is submitted simultaneously by two distinct bidders is positive.
For Because in G n ties in bids can occur with positive probability only at the bid zero, i's payo¤ atb n when his signal is s i 2 (s i ; ¹ s i ) and his bid (greater or equal to r for n large enough) is among the highest, is equal to E(u i (b n i (s i ); S)jS i = s i ;b n j (S j ) ·b n i (s i ); 8j 6 = i); unlessb n i (s i ) = 0 in which case his payo¤ is 1=N th as large. In either case, for every s i 2 (s i ; ¹ s i ); and for n large enough, we must have;
where the inequality follows because, in G n ; all bids greater or equal to r win with positive probability and the zero bid is available and yields at least zero utility;
18 De…ne s i = 1 if the set in its de…nition is empty, and de…ne ¹ s i = 0 if the set in its de…nition is empty.
19 Such s j 's always exist because our restriction requiresb n j (s j ) = 0 for all s j 2 [0; 1=n]:
and where the limit follows ifŝ j (s i ) > 0; 8j 6 = i: So, for every
(A.10) where the strict inequality follows because u i is strictly increasing in s i ; and the weak inequality follows from MW Thm. 5 becauseŝ j (s i ) · ¹ s j . Next, we wish to argue thatŝ j (s i ) = ¹ s j for every distinct i; j and every s i 2 (s i ; ¹ s i ): So, assume by way of contradiction thatŝ j (s i ) < ¹ s j for some i; j and some s i 2 (s i ; ¹ s i ): Then because f is strictly positive on [0; 1] N ; and ¹ s k > 0 for all k;
Consequently, by (A.10) and (A.11), 
Consequently, we may choose a subsequence n m of n such that n m¸m for all m; and such that for all s
is the di¤er-ence between the left-hand side and right-hand side in (A.12).
Hence, letting f i denote the marginal of f on bidder i's signal, we have, by Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem,
so that for m large enough,
But because n m¸m implies that B n m contains B m and so also that b m 2 B n m ; this contradictsb n m being an equilibrium in G nm : Therefore, we must haveŝ j (s i ) = ¹ s j for every s i 2 (s i ; ¹ s i ) and every distinct i; j: But this implies that for s i 2 (s i ; ¹ s i ) and s j 2 (s j ; ¹ s j );b n j (s j ) ·b n i (s i ) and (reversing the roles of i and j)b n j (s j )¸b n i (s i ); for all n large enough. Recalling that, in G n ; ties in bids can occur only at a bid of zero, we may conclude that for all distinct i; j; every s i 2 (s i ; ¹ s i ) and every s j 2 (s j ; ¹ s j );b n j (s j ) =b n i (s i ) = 0 for all n large enough. Choose i; j 2 I: Then, for every s i 2 (s i ; ¹ s i );
Pr(S k · ¹ s k ; 8k 6 = ijs i )E(u i (0; S)jS i = s i ; S k · ¹ s k ; 8k 6 = i) = Pr(S k ·ŝ k (s i ); 8k 6 = ijs i )E(u i (0; S)jS i = s i ; S k ·ŝ k (s i ); 8k 6 = i) > (A.13)
Pr(S k ·ŝ k (s i ); 8k 6 = ijs i ) 1 N E(u i (0; S)jS i = s i ; S k ·ŝ k (s i ); 8k 6 = i) > 0;
the third line being strictly positive because u i (0; s)¸0 is strictly increasing in s i ; and because Pr(S k ·ŝ k (s i ); 8k 6 = ijs i ) = Pr(S k · ¹ s k ; 8k 6 = ijs i ) > 0: The strict inequality in the second line, being N times the third line, then follows.
Observe now that the …rst line of (A.13) is the limit as n ! 1 and then as ± # 0;of s i 's payo¤ when he bids ± in G n ; while the third line is the limit of his payo¤ when he bidsb n i (s i ) = 0 in G n : Hence, as before, for n large enough, bidder i has a pro…table deviation in G n againstb n ¡i ; a contradiction. We conclude that, givenb; the probability that distinct bidders submit the highest bid weakly above r is zero.
We now complete the proof by showing thatb is an equilibrium. Note …rst that becauseb involves no ties at bids that win with positive probability, each V i (b) is continuous (in the topology of pointwise convergence) atb:
Assume by way of contradiction thatb is not an equilibrium. Then some bidder i has a pro…table deviation,b i say, which, without loss, is bounded (by A.1(ii)). Now,b i ; being measurable, is the pointwise limit of a sequence,b n i ; of simple functions. 21 Further, we may assume without loss that, for every n; the joint strategy (b n i ;b ¡i ) involves no ties at bids that win with positive probability and consequently that V i is continuous at (b 21 A simple function is one that takes on …nitely many values. 22 This is because eachb j induces a distribution of bids with at most countably many mass points. One can therefore choose the …nitely many values taken on by eachb n i to be distinct from all such mass points. is a pro…table deviation for bidder i; and V i is continuous at ( ¹ b i ;b ¡i ) So, altogether we have that
and V i is continuous at both ( ¹ b i ;b ¡i ) andb; where ¹ b i is de…ned by (A.14). Choose a sequence b n ! ¹ b so that b n 2 B n for every n: Then the sequence of bidding functions Consequently, for n large enough,
contradictingb n being an equilibrium of G n : We conclude thatb is an equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Consider any equilibrium b 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 (not necessarily pure). We …rst establish a number of claims.
Clearly, it is uniquely optimal for bidder 1 to bid zero when x = 1: Hence, it remains only to show that deviations for bidder 1 when x = 1 are strictly worse than following the given strategy. Now, if y = 0, he is supposed to bid 3, winning for sure and obtaining a payo¤ of 3: Clearly any deviation to 3 + ² is inferior while bidding 3 ¡ ² yields:
(3 ¡ ²)(1 ¡ strictly suboptimal for every value of " > 0 For x = 1 and y = 1, bidder 1 is supposed to bid 1 yielding an expected payo¤ of 1 2 £ 4 = 2. Clearly, for " > 0; any deviation to 1 + ² is inferior, while bidding 1 ¡ ² yields:
